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Abstract 
In hydro-political context, while Ethiopia had been able to propel its own 
canoe in the first half of the 20th century, a blend of factors worked in 
concert to deprive it of any meaningful prospect in the utilization of the 
Nile water resources within its jurisdiction. I argue that the Anglo-
Ethiopian Treaty of 1902 on the Blue Nile and the stream of negotiations 
conducted in the immediate aftermath on the grant of Lake Tana Dam 
concessions have engendered deleterious impacts on the legal position and 
sovereign interests of Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s imperial vacillation was 
vexatious, and British hegemonic designs of the time leaned too heavily 
towards Sudan and Egypt. As a result, the post-1950 period witnessed a 
waning influence of Ethiopia’s hydro-legal posture and the molding of 
deeply engrained perceptions of proprietorship along the downstream Nile.  
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Introduction 
The Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of May 1902 on the Blue Nile River, a pact that 
intertwined Ethiopian, Sudanese and Egyptian destinies in the first half of 
the 20th century, has greatly influenced Ethiopia’s sovereign interests in 
transboudary water rights in the subsequent decades. For a long period, the 
Treaty remained the single most authoritative instrument in the definition of 
water rights of the states of Sudan and Ethiopia. The legal arrangement 
represented a key episode at the zenith of Great Britain’s unremitting quest 
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for physical and juridical control of the Nile basin region and for securing 
the unhindered flow of the Nile river course downstream.  
The first section of this article examines the colonial and geo-political 
setting under which the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty was concluded, and 
the second section analyses the factors that impelled Emperor Menelik to 
extend the assurances contained in the Treaty. The third section deals with 
the implications of the Treaty on Ethiopia’s transboundary water rights. The 
fourth section dwells on a closely related subject: the negotiations history of 
the Lake Tana Dam concessions conducted in the immediate aftermath of 
the 1902 Treaty, and highlights the opportunities presented and challenges 
posed in relation to Ethiopia’s hydro-legal and developmental discourse. The 
last two sections supplement the discussion by a methodical presentation of 
how events unfolded in the pre-1956 epoch, leading to a steady decline of 
Ethiopia’s hydro-political influence in the post Tana dam periods, and the 
unproductive diplomatic and legal enterprises which Ethiopia staged to 
confront British, Sudanese and Egyptian machinations with regard to rights 
of utilization of the Nile River.  
1. Circumstances of the conclusion of the Anglo-Ethiopian 
Treaty of 1902 
In the immediate aftermath of the European scramble for the African 
continent in the 1880’s, the British colonial empire expanded its African 
acquisitions in fierce competition with the French. At the peak of its 
imperial power, the British dominion had extended over large territorial 
stretches across the East and North African regions situated in the Nile 
basin.1 By 1890, London had declared the whole Nile valley as its sphere of 
influence.2 Yet, instead of taking control of the entire river and the banks by 
itself, Tvedt writes, during the stated period, the principal target of British 
imperialism in the eastern Nile (i.e. the Ethiopian Blue Nile) had been to 
keep away European powers, and specially France, from acquiring any 
foothold in the Nile basin.3 In the negotiations relating to east and north-
eastern Africa which Lord Salisbury had conducted with a series of 
                                           
1 Tadesse Kassa Woldetsadik (2013), International Watercourses Law in the Nile 
Basin: Three States at a Crossroads. New York / Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge 
Taylor and Francis Group, p. 50. 
2 Terje Tvedt (2004), The River Nile in the Age of the British, Political Ecology and 
the Quest for Economic Power. London / New York, I.B.  
3 Ibid. 
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European counterparts in 1890-91, the desire to safeguard waters of the 
upper and middle Nile occupied a predominant position.4 Therefore, in order 
to fill the vacuum created by the absence of any European footing in 
Ethiopia after the defeat of Italy in 1896, it was only sensible for Great 
Britain to tie a covenant with Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia.  
The immediate genesis of the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of May 1902 dates 
back to the negotiations conducted during the concluding years of the 19th 
century and the diplomatic notes exchanged in March 1902 between 
Monsieur Alfred Ilg, Emperor Menelik’s foreign affairs councillor, and Lt. 
Colonel John Harrington, the British emissary in Addis Ababa.5 The 
negotiation was initiated after Emperor Menelik sent, in April 1891, a 
circular letter to European powers defining what he considered to be the 
bounds of the Ethiopian borders.6 For Menelik, the regularization of his 
country’s international boundaries was only inevitable given that both 
Ethiopia and the European powers had been engaged in the expansion of 
new territorial acquisitions. The Emperor’s diplomatic note intended to 
circumvent the incidence of conflicts of interest with European states and 
specially the British who had then occupied Sudan, a colony sharing a vast 
expanse of territory with the western parts of the Ethiopian state. In such 
context, the border squabble along the western corridors of Ethiopia 
constituted high profile mission of the British agent, Colonel Harrington, 
when, in 1897, he assumed office as his kingdom’s representative in 
Ethiopia. 
Judging by contents of the texts of the Treaty, the arrangement was 
initiated to address frontier issues. From the provisions of the Treaty and 
related legal and historical chronicles, it could be gathered that the most 
important object and purpose of the accord, the design that prompted the 
parties to conclude the agreement had been to settle and delineate 
                                           
4 G. N. Sanderson (1964), ‘England, Italy, the Nile Valley and the European 
Balance, 1890–91’, The Historical Journal, vol. 7, p. 94. 
5 A technocrat in engineering and diplomacy, since 1879, Alfred Ilg had rendered 
three decades of services to Emperor Menelik. In recognition of his contributions, 
he was appointed as ‘Councillor of State, together with the many honours and 
commercial concessions’ in 1896. 
      Harold G. Marcus (1995), The Life and Times of Menelik II, Ethiopia 1844-
1913, New Jersey: The Red Sea Press Inc., p. 59. 
6 Harold G. Marcus (1963), ‘Ethio-British Negotiations Concerning the Western 
Border with Sudan, 1896-1902’, 4(1) The Journal of African History, p. 82.  
      Also accounted in: British Foreign Office, Circular Letter, April 1891, FO 
403/155; and Menelik to Rodd, 13 May 1897, FO 1/32. 
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longstanding boundary issues between the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and 
Ethiopia. Among others, this is evident from the Treaty’s preamble which 
reads that the parties ‘being animated with the desire to confirm the friendly 
relations between the two powers and to settle the frontier between the 
Sudan and Ethiopia…’ had contracted to conclude the bilateral accord.  
The achievement of a specific Ethiopian pledge of non-interference with 
the flows of the Blue Nile waters was appended as component of Col. 
Harrington’s undertaking only in due course, and upon express instructions 
from his superiors in Cairo and London. In fact, until 1900, Harrington, Ilg 
and Emperor Menelik had been seriously engaged in winding-up their 
negotiations that covered no other theme than the regularization and 
reciprocal recognition of territorial gains.7 By September 1900 when the two 
powers appeared to have completed of the painstaking border negotiations, 
the British Foreign Office redefined the tasks of its representation in Addis 
Ababa. Harrington was instructed to approach the Ethiopian government 
with a view to getting hold of a guarantee for the unimpeded flow of the 
Blue Nile and the Sobat rivers and a right to construct a railway through the 
Ethiopian territory.8 Both the British and Col. Harington were convinced 
that if they signed the frontier treaty alone, the chances of subsequently 
securing Ethiopia’s consent on the Blue Nile would simply be 
unconceivable.9  
The sequences of low-level frontier negotiations were thus followed by 
discussions on the content and form of Ethiopia’s undertaking with regard to 
the Blue Nile, the Sobat and Lake Tana. On March 18, 1902, it was reported 
that the British Government received a note of agreement from Ethiopia,10 
although the facts and specifics remained too contentious in the following 
years. Ilg, the Emperor’s Conseiller d’Etat, allegedly dispatched the 
Ethiopian note although at the time he was neither a state official nor a 
designated agent of the Ethiopian government with a capacity to conclude 
                                           
7 Harrington to Salisbury, 14 May 1900, FO 403/299. 
8 Tadesse K. Woldetsadik, supra note 1, pp. 92-93. 
9 Harrington to Lansdowne, 20 March 1902, No.6, FO 1/40. 
10 Ilg to Harrington, 18 March 1902, FO 403/322; also reported in: Abyssinia, 
Record of meetings to discuss the method of negotiation with Abyssinian 
Government for the Lake Tana Concession, 4 August 1926, FO 371/13099; Lake 
Tana, Record of Conversation between Dr Martin and Murray, 11 November 
1927, FO 371/12343. 
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binding pacts.11 The British Foreign Office itself affirmed that on March 18, 
1902, Alfred Ilg, not Emperor Menelik, had sent a note to Great Britain 
containing an article which established limitations on future rights of 
Ethiopia in the utilization of the Nile River water resources.12  
To counter the challenges that arose in Ethiopian quarters from time to 
time, Great Britain had laboured ceaselessly to establish both the existence 
and validity of the notes exchanged between the two states. In a later address 
to the League of Nations in 1926, for example, the British Government 
admitted that ‘…notes were exchanged between the British Minister in 
Addis Ababa and the Ethiopian Government on 18 March 1902 wherein 
Emperor Menelik confirmed an oral undertaking given some days ago…that 
there should not be interference with the waters of the Blue Nile…’. Under 
the note, Ethiopia reportedly undertook a commission that ‘there is to be no 
interference with the flow of the Blue Nile or Lake Tana except with the 
consultation of His Majesty’s Government’, and that should there be any 
interference, ‘all conditions being equal, preference will be given to 
proposals of His Britannic Majesty’s Government. His Majesty Emperor 
Menelik has no intention of giving any concessions with regard to the Blue 
Nile and Lake Tana except to His Britannic Majesty’s Government, the 
Government of Sudan or one of their subjects.’13 
Incidentally also, in 1926, the Foreign Office deliberated on the nature of 
the offer submitted to Ethiopia in exchange for water storage concession on 
Lake Tana wherein it took the view that Ethiopia’s own proposal ‘to build 
the dam is hardly in accordance with the notes exchanged on 18 March 1902 
between Sir J Harrington and M Alfred Ilg, duly authorized thereto by 
Emperor Menelik.’14 Similarly, on November 11, 1927, Great Britain 
conferred with Dr Martin, named plenipotentiary of the Ethiopian 
                                           
11 Public international law proffers stricter rules defining the competence of 
authorities representing a state in negotiating, adopting and authenticating texts 
of a treaty, and expressing consent of a state to be bound. For specifics, see 
Article 7-8 of the UN Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). 
12 Ilg to Harrington, 18 March 1902, FO 403/322.  
13 Ibid; also reported in: British Foreign Office: Abyssinia, Record of Meetings to 
Discuss the Method of Negotiation with Abyssinian Government for the Lake 
Tana Concession, 4 August 1926, FO 371/13099; British Foreign Office: Lake 
Tana, Record of Conversation between Dr Martin and Murray, 11 November 
1927, FO 371/12343.  
14 British Foreign Office: Abyssinia, Record of meetings to discuss the method of 
negotiation with Abyssinian Government for the Lake Tana Concession, 4 
August 1926, FO 371/13099. 
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government in the dam negotiation with J G White Engineering. On the 
occasion, the British sounded that an ‘exchange of notes between Sir 
Harrington and Monsieur Ilg in 1902 (had been effected) whereby Emperor 
Menelik undertook, other things being equal, only to entrust the construction 
of the reservoir to His Majesty’s Government or the Government of Sudan 
or one of their subjects.’15 On December 7 of the same year, Bentinck, the 
British ambassador in Ethiopia, took audience with Ras Teferi in Addis 
Ababa - later crowned as Emperor Haileselassie I; resentful of Ethiopia’s 
dealings with an American company which antagonized British longstanding 
propositions, Bentinck ‘reminded him (the Ras) of the notes exchanged 
between Ilg and Harrington.’16 He also read out to Dr Martin the text of the 
of the Ilg-Harrington notes which the British held as binding.17  
Dr Martin denied knowledge of the existence of any such notes, and 
subsequently disputed their binding effect. However, on official level, Ras 
Teferi wanted to offset British diplomatic rhetoric against the US and in 
Ethiopia, and embarked on a course that aimed at clearing the legal hurdles 
poised upfront; he had to put the state’s house in order before he could 
auction his dam scheme abroad, although all along, London resisted his 
moves. Great Britain consistently held that the contents of the note had been 
duly authorised in line with the internal constitutional orders, and was 
properly endorsed by the respective governments of the two states. 
On his part, Ras Teferi did not yield to British reading of rights. When 
provoked by Bentinck’s analysis of ‘assumed rights’ under the notes, the 
Crown Regent, who appeared to have been informed about the signature and 
the seal pressed on the instruments, demanded to be advised of ‘whose seal 
was on Ilg’s note’. He challenged the ‘right of Ilg to give assurances 
contained in the note of 18 March 1902 to His Majesty’s Minister on the 
grounds that he was merely an advisor to the Ethiopian Government.’18  
Trapped off-guard, London anxiously searched for originals in state 
libraries and legations but to no avail. A copy produced from Harrington’s 
despatch was traced, and in the language of the officer who undertook the 
charge, it was reported the ‘seal appears to be that of Alfred Ilg, Conseiller 
                                           
15 British Foreign Office: Lake Tana, Record of Conversation between Dr Martin 
and Murray, 11 November 1927, FO 371/12343. 
16 Bentinck to Austen Chamberlain, 14 December 1927, FO 371/13099, Addis 
Ababa. 
17 Bentinck to Austen Chamberlain, 30 January 1928, FO 371/13099, Addis Ababa 
18 Bentinck, Lake Tana, 12 December 1927, FO 371/12341 Addis Ababa. 
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d’Etat.’19 Bentinck and his colleagues at the Foreign Office conceived the 
chilly implication of this development on Great Britain’s legal standing. In a 
handwritten memo scribed on the very dispatch remitted by Bentinck, an 
alternative line of legal argument was framed. British diplomats projected to 
make out a case in support of their position based on two correlated grounds. 
First, they held that the exchanged notes would be binding because ‘it is 
inconceivable that Emperor Menelik, after the audience on March 13, was 
ignorant of the fact that Monsieur Ilg had returned a reply to Lt. Col. 
Harrington’. Secondly, the British argued that ‘a government cannot evade 
responsibility for obligation which a person in their employ signs in their 
name and with their consent.’20 
As revealed in the subsequent sections, the significance of the notes 
exchanged rests not only on the deleterious effect they engendered on 
Ethiopia’s sovereign interests in the subsequent decades, but the notes also 
constituted the essentials on which the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1902 had 
been founded. The literature and diplomatic records availed on the subject 
are too scanty to discern with reasonable certainty how the negotiations in 
March 1902 evolved into the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of May 15, 1902. 
However, it is evident that the talks leading to the conclusion of the Treaty 
had continued in the subsequent weeks - following the exchange of the 
notes. The formalities of treaty conclusion notwithstanding, this gives the 
impression that the Ethiopian note had served as a mere gesture of 
understanding reached on major issues, and perhaps not as an expression of 
a definitive commitment. In fact, weeks after the exchange of the notes, Ilg 
had to continue working on a complete reconstruction of the deal he 
submitted previously with provisions ‘about Lake Tsana and the Blue Nile 
which absolutely knocks the bottom out of the exchange of notes on this 
subject … and a clause that the treaty was to hold good for ten years and 
could be terminated by six months notice being given by either side’.21 
In any event, historian Harold Marcus confirmed that on May 15, 1902, 
Great Britain and Ethiopia had in fact been able to conclude in Addis Ababa 
the ‘Treaty Between Ethiopia and the United Kingdom Relative to the 
Frontiers between the Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea’ with a view to settling 
the border issue between Sudan and Ethiopia.22 The Treaty incorporated a 
single provision on the rights of utilization of the Blue Nile, Baro Akobo and 
                                           
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Harold Marcus, supra note 6, p. 94. 
22 Ibid.  
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Lake Tana. A few authors challenged this story, and claimed that the Treaty 
was never ratified, nor put into effect in Ethiopia. In the words of James 
Robertson, for example, Menelik promised Great Britain in May 1902 not to 
interfere with the Blue Nile waters and did in fact honour this promise, but 
he never ratified it in an official agreement.23  
However, the accord was presented to both Houses of the Parliament in 
the United Kingdom in December 1902 by commands of ‘His Majesty’, and 
a letter of ratification submitted to Ethiopia on October 28, 1902.24 
A substantial moderation from the notes exchanged in March, the English 
version of Art. III of the resulting agreement stipulated that ‘His Majesty 
Emperor Menelik, king of kings of Ethiopia, engages himself towards the 
Government of His Britannic Majesty not to construct or allow to be 
constructed any works across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana or the Sobat, which 
would arrest the flow of their waters in to the Nile, except with His 
Britannic Majesty’s agreement and the Government of the Sudan.’ Sudan 
considered a partner in the English version of the agreement was left out in 
the Amharic version which reads: 
 
In the succeeding years, British and Ethiopian understanding of the scope of 
obligation stipulated under Art. III differed; Great Britain assumed that with 
the exception of domestic uses and local irrigational rights, the agreement 
had definitively deprived Ethiopia of the right to use the resource in any way 
whatsoever, while Ethiopia’s reading submitted that only complete arrest of 
the flows of the river had been prohibited under the treaty arrangement.  
                                           
23 James Robertson (1978), ‘British policy in east Africa’, The English historical 
review, vol.93, no 369, p. 835. 
24 London, Printed for His Majesty’s Stationary Office, Harrison and Sons, St. 
Martines Lane. 
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2. Factors that prompted Emperor Menelik to conclude 
the Treaty 
In understanding piercing details of the legal history on the subject, one of 
the elemental questions that has been put forward and hence merits 
investigation relates to the legal, economic and geo-political setting under 
which Emperor Menelik undertook the assurances offered under Article III 
of the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty. Great Britain had for long considered Sudan, 
especially the Nile Valley in the Sudan as Egyptian Territory. In fact, 
between 1899 and 1955, Sudan was a colonial territory administered through 
a joint Anglo-Egyptian authority - so-called codomini, with the British 
having a say on key matters. The British had therefore concluded the Treaty 
as a protector and overseer of the interests of Egypt. 
Great Britain’s political machination under the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty - 
which secured its hydraulic interests on the Blue Nile - had constituted only 
one facet of a prudently coordinated initiative across the basin for absolute 
control of the Nile River water resources. On different occasions, London 
had already obtained similar guarantees from the Belgian Congo and Italy,25 
who controlled petite constituencies in the Nile basin, as well as from the 
French and the Germans. Great Britain’s close association with the subject, 
from the very early years of Lord Cromer - the British viceroy in Egypt and 
master architect of the Nile politics at the tail of the 19th century - till the 
1950’s was dictated by the overwhelming strategic, economic and political 
necessities of its geo-political and capitalist enterprises in Egypt, Sudan and 
the Near East.  
On the other hand, from a closer reading of diplomatic and historical 
chronicles made available, it is not clear why Emperor Menelik had to 
reduce himself to an arrangement that ostensibly proffered far-reaching 
limitation on Ethiopia’s sovereignty in relation to future rights of use of the 
                                           
25 Protocol between the British and Italian Governments for the demarcation of their 
respective spheres of influence in Eastern Africa, from the river Juba to the Blue 
Nile, 24  March 1891; Protocol between the British and Italian Governments for 
the demarcation of their respective spheres of influence in East Africa, From Ras 
Kasar to the Blue Nile, 15 April 1891; Treaty Between the United Kingdom and 
the Independent State of Congo to Redefine their Respective Spheres of 
Influence in Eastern and Central Africa, London, 9 May 1906. 
       Reprinted in: Sir Edward Hertslet (1894), The Map of Africa by Treaty, 
London: Harrison and Sons, vol. II. No 103-208, pp. 665-669.  
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Nile waters. After all, the provision of non-interference under the accord 
was sanctioned after intensive negotiations involving, among others, the 
Emperor’s Swiss advisor, Alfred Ilg. The Treaty was also signed in an epoch 
when the Emperor had himself engaged in immense nation building 
enterprise, advancing bold territorial claims as far as Khartoum and regions 
of the Blue and White Nile in the Sudan; such facts tend to refute the 
assumptions that the Emperor would display a grave act of imprudence by 
conceding (under the Treaty) Ethiopia’s sovereign prerogatives in the Nile 
river resources.  
What is more, the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty was concluded less than a 
decade after the colonial force of a major European power, Italy, was 
defeated at the battle of Adwa, in North Ethiopia, in 1896. This reinforces 
the theory that the Treaty was signed in a cordial milieu where Emperor 
Menelik had commanded economic and political confidence both in local 
and regional affairs. In fact, a detailed account of some of the diplomatic 
communications effected during the border negotiation confirm that Ethiopia 
had engaged in the treaty as a co-equal, from an angle of strength, and not 
submission. As compared to the immediately preceding decade, clearly 
discernible and impending threats to Ethiopia’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity was not in attendance - at least during the conclusion of the treaty. 
One line of argument explaining the imperial action could be that for the 
Emperor, the whole treaty package constituted a legal forum for soliciting 
formal recognition of Ethiopia’s sovereign control over the vast territories 
annexed during his decade-long nation building campaigns. The ‘give and 
take’ feature of the contemporaneous diplomatic engagements could have 
dictated such a course. Conventionally, such processes call for trade-offs 
between various interests of the partaking states.   
Likewise, it could be submitted that the Emperor used the Treaty as part 
of a broader diplomatic invent to maintain the territorial integrity of the 
Ethiopian state by remaining neutral in his dealings with the three major 
European states of the time: France, Great Britain and Italy. During this 
period, each of the states had continually hovered around Ethiopia with 
conflicting strategic interests. Along with other compromises, the guarantee 
under Article III had been slotted to meet such objective.  
Equally, it was also evident that in the early decades of the 20th century, 
Ethiopia had hardly had any irrigational schemes to speak of, and it would 
not be totally inconceivable that the complex geographical landscape 
through which the rivers traverse may have convinced the Emperor to 
underrate the significance of prospective uses of the resources for 
agricultural purposes in Ethiopia. This is not of course to discount the 
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possibility of leasing cultivable lands - at least through the employ of 
European capital and technology. Many sources of the time had accounted 
that from European perspective, the depth of hydraulic information and 
engineering knowledge availed during the Treaty’s conclusion was not too 
shallow to prompt the Emperor to dismiss the incidence of future water 
resource development works in Ethiopia. In fact, in the immediate aftermath 
of the Treaty, there were reports which acknowledged that Italy had 
submitted a request for irrigational concessions along the lower lands of the 
basin in Ethiopia.26  
Whatever the geo-political setting under which the Treaty was 
established, Emperor Menelik knew from the outset that he was dipping his 
country into unchartered legal ploys which might well be interpreted as a 
poor bargain when viewed from the perspective of Ethiopia’s national 
interests on the Nile. That explains why in the course of 1902-1907, the 
Emperor had ceaselessly endeavoured to play-down the negative 
implications of the Treaty through a series of negotiations. In one of the 
diplomatic arrangements, he not only refused to receive British offers of 
‘financial compensation’ for his undertaking, he also worked on the 
‘insertion of an interpretative clause’ into Article III of the Treaty. 
The idea of pecuniary reward to Emperor Menelik in consideration for 
his pledge under the Treaty started to float following a statement by 
Harrington, the British  emissary in Addis Ababa, that his government had 
‘no desire to demand from the Emperor that he should deprive himself of a 
valuable asset without equivalent compensation.’27 Great Britain was 
definitively convinced that the pact validated a permanent renunciation of 
Ethiopian rights in respect of the use of the Nile.28 Hence, in 1904, Lord 
Cromer authorised Harrington to enter into negotiations and extend to 
Emperor Menelik a British offer of fiscal subsidy as a reward for his 
pledges. The Anglo-Sudan government undertook ‘to pay to the Emperor or 
his successors a sum of £10,000 sterling annually so long as the friendly 
relations of the two governments continue.’29 The sum was raised over the 
years as the negotiations lingered.    
Yet, in spite of the protracted efforts by the British to get the Emperor on 
board the subsidy scheme and some progresses in 1907, Menelik neither 
                                           
26 Telegram from Cromer, 7–9 March 1907, FO 371/14591, Cairo. 
27 British Foreign Office, Memorandum: History of the Lake Tana Negotiation, 23 
January 1923, FO 371/8403. 
28 Tadesse K. Woldetsadik, supra note 1, pp. 84,88. 
29 British Foreign Office, supra note 27. 
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refused to accept the grant, nor approved contents of the subsidy enclosure. 
He simply chose to forward a new requirement: he held that an 
‘interpretative provision’ should be inserted into the Treaty although it 
remained unclear why he wished to put forth such a qualification.  
In February 1907, Mr Clark, London’s representative in Addis Ababa, 
requested Lord Cromer ‘if there is any objection to my giving Emperor 
Menelik written assurance on behalf of the Anglo-Sudanese Government 
that Article III of the May 15, 1902 Treaty is in no way meant to interfere 
with local irrigation rights of natives of districts watered by Lake Tana, Blue 
Nile and the Sobat.’30 He did not say what ‘local irrigational rights’ as such 
involve. However, a month later, Clark reported that Menelik had made it 
difficult to sign the negotiated note without an unequivocal extension of the 
assurances contained above, and submitted his observation that the real 
cause that prompted him to put the signature on hold was that ‘he wants to 
sell cotton concessions in the low country and fears that we may object to 
making canals for irrigation.’31  
On advice of his irrigation experts, Cromer ordered Clark to give a 
guardedly framed surety to Menelik that ‘the terms of Article III of the 
Treaty of May 15, 1902 do not imply any intention of interfering with local 
native rights, provided that no attempt is made to arrest or interfere in any 
way with the flow of these rivers by placing obstructions of any sort in their 
channels or by constructing regulators or dams of any kind across their 
channels or beds.’32 Surprisingly, the Emperor still chose not to accept the 
arrangement. Two decades later, Foreign Office officials construed in 
retrospect that Menelik’s enterprise was an attempt to ‘get something in note 
watering down or interpreting [the existing treaty] in the sense which he 
wishes it’33 to imply.  
Apparently, the Emperor was striving to undo or trim-down the harm 
supposedly inflicted by signing the Treaty with the British and exploit the 
occasion to convey a line of responsibility which his undertaking under 
Article III shall be interpreted as entailing. In view of his qualified leverage 
in a decentralized administrative structure in Ethiopia, the Emperor had 
grasped that politically, it would be suicidal to engage in private-like treaties 
which could be interpreted as trading-out sovereign interests. On one 
                                           
30 Draft Telegram to Cromer, 16 February 1907, FO 371/14591, Addis Ababa 
31 Ibid. 
32 Telegram from Cromer, March 7-9, 1907, FO 371/14591, Cairo. 
33 Sir Barton, Lake Tana Negotiations, 18 August 1930, FO 371/14591, Addis 
Ababa. 
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occasion, the Emperor reportedly justified his stipulation for the insertion of 
an interpretative clause since without such enclosure, the subsidy 
arrangement in return for which he would have received fiscal recompense 
might be identified as a price for the purchase of Nile waters for which ‘he 
will be accused of selling his country.’34 
3. Connotations of the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty on 
Ethiopia’s sovereign interests 
Issues relating to continued validity notwithstanding, the Anglo-Ethiopian 
Treaty, along with the subsequent developments on the Lake Tana Dam 
negotiations, had adversely sealed the fate of Ethiopia’s sovereign interests 
from the outset - and continued to do so during the first half of the 20th 
century. This was sensed in the Ethiopian quarters.   
In the immediate aftermath of the conclusion of the Treaty, the potential 
for interpretation of the Treaty, and particularly its English text, as 
forbearing meaningful scales of development of the river in Ethiopia was in 
the cards. In reality, Great Britain had argued its case and successfully 
marshalled the agreement to stifle Ethiopia’s contemplations for irrigational 
and hydropower developments. If on a few occasions, schemes hardly 
suiting British imperial designs for the region had resurfaced on the political 
platform in Ethiopia, but in each case, London reminded the Ethiopian 
governments, foreign states or private enterprises drawn by prospects of 
concessions and joint ventures that no water control structures could be 
placed across the river without its sanction.35 The post-independence and 
contemporary posture of the states of Egypt and Sudan is profoundly 
moulded by such imperial stratagem and philosophy. 
Ethiopia’s reactions to the legal and diplomatic predicament was 
somewhat assorted. Before the formal termination of British colonial status 
in the Sudan, the contents and legal ramifications of the Treaty were 
subjected to meticulous scrutiny, Anglo-Sudanese contentions of continued 
validity notwithstanding.  Emperor Menelik was not alone in this diplomatic 
confront. 
As Crown Regent, Ras Teferi pursued a cautious but aggressive policy. 
Following sequences of negotiations on the Lake Tana Dam concession 
which he consciously turned torpid, the Ras instigated in 1927 a major legal 
encounter drawing the British Government’s attention to the particular 
                                           
34 Ibid. 
35 Tadesse K. Woldetsadik, supra note 1, p. 91. 
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composition of the words of Article III of the Treaty. He argued that 
‘Emperor Menelik has [only] made a treaty not to construct a work which 
will block up the river completely’,36 hence interpreting the accord as 
permitting the construction of edifices that entail less detriment on 
downstream flows. Again, as early as in 1924, in a memo addressed to the 
British Prime Minister, the Emperor restated his government’s formal 
resolve to build the dam as an Ethiopian enterprise, ‘in its own interests… 
and rent to the Sudan Government the surplus waters.’37 The deportments 
mirrored in the ensuing trilateral conferences dwarfed the conventional 
assumptions of British rights - upsetting the non-interference theory under 
Article III.  
In diplomatic circles too, the Emperor disputed, openly, the legal basis on 
which British and Sudanese claims had been formulated. He decreed his 
case that the contemporaneous Anglo-Sudanese perceptions and initiatives 
had only intended to meet the economic and political calls of the 
downstream states - without any regard to the development needs of his 
nation. In fact, in the late 1920’s and throughout the first half of the 1930’s, 
Ethiopia’s engagement with the American J. G. White Engineering 
Corporation and the Sudanese government had political objectives as a 
platform for demonstrating Ethiopia’s ‘readings’ of the commitment under 
Article III of the Treaty.  
Likewise, on different occasions, Emperor Haileselassie had endeavoured 
to deal with Ethiopia’s apparent position of submission under the Treaty. He 
treaded quite a length on two vital historical junctures where he pronounced 
the Treaty as no longer binding his country in its relations with the Sudan. In 
1954, the British Embassy reported the Emperor pronounced pointedly, but 
only for a less convincing reason, that ‘the 1902 Treaty was not valid 
because, we [Great Britain] had not paid £10,000 a year’38 stated in the 
subsidy arrangement.39 The British emissary mocked over the claim and 
                                           
36 Teferi to Austen Chamberlain, Enclosure in Addis Ababa Dispatch 363, Bentinck 
to sir Austen Chamberlain, 14 December 1927, FO 371/13099, Addis Ababa 
37 Teferi to Ramsay McDonald, 26 July 1924, FO 371/10872, Paris. 
        Also reported in:  The Autobiography of Emperor Haileselassie I King of 
Kings of All Ethiopia and the Lord of Lords, My life and the Ethiopian Progress 
1892-1937 (1976), Volume I, p.107,125 (translated and annoted by Edward 
Ullendorff). 
38 Douglas to Bernand, 2 April 1954, FO 371/108264, British Embassy, Addis 
Ababa. 
39 On 14 July 1930, Belatengheta Herui Woldeselassie, Director General for 
Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, demanded Sir Barton, the British representative in 
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proposed ‘to knock the Emperor down’ by making sure that Article III did 
not contain ‘a horrid sentence in the end saying the Treaty is only valid so 
long as it means what I want it to mean and not what you think it means.’40  
The second occasion related to Great Britain’s recognition de jure of the 
Italian conquest of Ethiopia. In the 1930’s, the growing hostility between 
Ethiopia and Italy obliged the British to fine-tune the policies in respect of 
relations with both states, and adopt measures that accommodate its 
hydraulic interests in the basin. 
In October 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia. In spite of the prevalence of an 
entrenched local resistance that defied Italy’s effective control, the British 
government recognized de facto the authority of the occupying force in 
1936. Its Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy convening in March 1938 
dealt with the question of recognition de jure of Italian status in Ethiopia.41 
In an annex of the Anglo-Italian Treaty signed on April 16, 1938, Great 
Britain ‘assumed towards Italy an undertaking to recognize the Italian 
Government as de jure sovereign of the State of Ethiopia.’42  
In 1956, Ethiopia employed this ground - handing out a pamphlet 
prepared by its agent, Mr. Pierre Petridis that, among others, contested the 
                                                                                                       
Addis Ababa, for the payment of an accrued sum totalling £230,000 Sterling 
which Great Britain ‘pledged’ under terms negotiated in 1907. The sum was 
supposed to be paid to Emperor Menelik as an annual subsidy in consideration 
for his undertaking under Article III of the Treaty.   
      Director General for Foreign Affairs to Sir S. Barton, FO 371/14591, 14 July 
1930, Addis Ababa. 
      The British Government examined the legal and economic implications of the 
new opening which Ethiopia had withheld before, but considered the matter as 
‘blackmail’ by an Emperor, who, with the ‘approaching coronation [in 
1930]…will resort to any expedient which seems to offer even a faint hope of 
producing some dollars.’ Although Great Britain acknowledged that an offer was 
made to Emperor Menelik, it argued the proposal was never endorsed by him 
forthwith nor claimed for subsequently, and hence regarded as lapsed.  
      Sir S. Barton to John Murray, 19 August 1930, FO 371/14591, British Legation, 
Addis Ababa; A. Henderson to Sir S. Barton, Enclosure in No I., 31 December 
1930, FO 371/14591, Addis Ababa. 
40 Douglas to Bernand, 2 April 1954, FO 371/108264, British Embassy, Addis 
Ababa.  
41 Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy, Draft Conclusions of the 28th Meeting of 
the Committee, 29 March 1938, FO 371/22010, London. 
42 Selected Speeches of His Imperial Majesty Haileselassie I: 1918-1967 (1967), 
One Drop Books, New York, p.319. 
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validity of the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty, given that Great Britain had 
recognized de jure Italian occupation of Ethiopia in 1938. The pertinent 
rules of international law that apply to state succession in rem treaties are 
obviously complicated. British officials conceived they had to contend with 
the intricate nature of the legal questions involving the validity of the 1902 
Treaty. It is not therefore surprising that in reacting to Petridis’ pamphlet, 
Foreign Office legal experts and the British Embassy in Addis Ababa had to 
belittle the legal effects of recognition. They submitted that while the matter 
no longer made up a principal concern of the British policy, they took the 
view that Article III constituted part of the context of a boundary treaty, and 
hence that the ‘1902 Treaty should in principle be regarded as surviving the 
acquisition of independence by the Sudan and as remaining in force between 
the Sudan and Ethiopia.’43 
The British approach notwithstanding, the Emperor was not in a position 
to take immediate actions with regard to the Treaty as Ethiopia remained 
under British military administration throughout 1941 - following the defeat 
of Italian forces; the Emperor was only partially reinstated to his throne. 
However, under the Anglo-Ethiopian Convention of January 1942 which 
discussed the restoration of Ethiopia’s sovereignty, the fate of the Anglo-
Ethiopian Treaty of 1902 was not addressed at all - and this despite the 
Emperor’s previous history of robust challenge of the accord and a realistic 
opportunity then presented. The 1942 agreement was superseded by a more 
comprehensive accord in December 1944 - the Agreement for the Regulation 
of Mutual Relations - an arrangement which formally reinstated Ethiopia’s 
independence; and still, no talk was held with regard to the continuity or 
revocation of the 1902 Treaty. Speculations were rife in the British Foreign 
Office establishment that Ethiopia would naturally cause its pre-existing 
treaty relations with Great Britain to lapse as the result of the latter’s official 
recognition of Italian conquest, but the Emperor took such steps only 
belatedly - nearly after a decade.  
The post-war and post-independence political milieu had noticeably 
transformed in the basin, and with it, the context of the political, economic 
and strategic configuration. In light of such changing circumstances and its 
waning clout in the region, Great Britain could not continue to impose and 
campaign for its long practiced non-interference policy with regard to the 
Nile waters upstream. Instead, against the background of the water-sharing 
                                           
43 P.R.A Mansfield to J.F.S Phillips, Nile Waters, 27 April 1956, FO 371/119061,  
Addis Ababa; also in: E.B. Boothby to D.L. Busk, 5 February 1954, FO 
371/108264,  London. 
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negotiations between Egypt and Sudan, the British opted to counsel Ethiopia 
to stake its claims of ‘water quotas’ with the Egyptian and Sudanese 
governments and work expeditiously on the complete survey of the Blue 
Nile River so as to pre-empt the downstream states before they can claim to 
have acquired prior rights. However, after fifty years of inflexible legal 
diplomacy, the damage to the Ethiopian state was already done; the British 
had succeeded in instilling a deeply ingrained possessory perception in both 
Egypt and Sudan. The Treaty’s deleterious effect on Ethiopia’s sovereignty 
and developmental interests had been observed both in the pre-war epoch 
between Ethiopia and Italy as well as since the independence of the basin 
states in the 1950’s.  
4. Negotiations history of the Lake Tana dam 
concessions: opportunity missed? 
The Anglo-Ethiopian negotiations held for five decades with a view to 
securing a permit for the construction and operation of a dam facility on the 
Lake Tana are little accounted in historical and hydro-legal discourses. 
Ironically, it was the intense diplomatic rhetoric and practice of the time that 
shaped, so profoundly, both the nature and form of the national positions 
maintained by Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, and continued to influence 
perceptions of user rights in the subsequent decades. 
From the very outset, Great Britain had identified the great potentials of 
both the Blue Nile River and the Lake Tana. In the last decade of the 19th 
century, the prime occupation of British foreign policy in the region had 
particularly whirled on the issue of obtaining two vital concessions. The first 
related to an Ethiopian treaty undertaking guaranteeing the unimpeded flow 
of the Blue Nile River (and its tributaries) downstream, while the second 
referred to the acquisition of a special privilege for the construction and 
operation of a dam on the head sources of the river at Lake Tana and the 
leasing of its waters. The Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1902 proffered only 
part of the longstanding British aspiration.  
The Lake Tana Dam scheme was designed to meet the rapid expansion of 
irrigational water requirements in Egypt, and later, in the Sudan. The 
placement of such a structure was required to retain the floods of the river 
during the Ethiopian summer and to permit a steady supply of the waters 
down the stream during the low rain-yielding seasons of the year. The 
dominant thinking of the time at the Foreign Office reasoned that the 
economic prospect of Egypt and Sudan as well as the competitive 
advantages of the British cotton industry, then a pillar of its capitalist 
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enterprise, could only be realized, among others, through the institution of 
water storage schemes on the headwaters of the Blue Nile River in Ethiopia. 
Between 1902-03, C.E. Dupuis had already undertaken an expedition on 
the Lake Tana environs based on the instructions of Sir William Garstin, 
then Advisor to the Egyptian Ministry of Public Works. The results of the 
investigation presented for the first time a comprehensive review of the 
nature and flow of the Nile and its various tributaries, and established that 
Lake Tana would make an excellent reservoir.44  
Garstin had long dismissed, for ‘political reasons’, the option of Great 
Britain itself constructing ‘the ideal project’ for a regulation at the outlet of 
Lake Tana by converting the Lake in to a storage reservoir of adequate 
capacity.45 In contrast, the British Foreign Office and Lord Cromer, 
London’s viceroy in Egypt, had clandestinely laboured on the plan since the 
turn of the 20th Century.  
One of the earliest dispatches on the subject was effected by Harrington 
when he was authorized to make an arrangement for a possible building of a 
British Dam on Lake Tana and payment to the Emperor and his successors 
of 10,000 Sterling annually, as long as the friendly relations between the two 
governments continued and Menelik agreed not to construct any work on the 
Nile or its tributaries.46 The first serious articulation of such a proposal was 
tabled during the exchange of notes of March 1902.  
Apart from the dam’s potential role as a political lever against Egyptian 
nationalism, Lord Allenby, the British High Commissioner in Egypt (1919-
1925) retrospectively depicted the long accepted financial implications of 
the undertaking on the British Empire. He noted ‘on the assumption that 
three thousand million cubic meters are made available by the reservoir 
during the low stages of the Nile, this would be sufficient for the cultivation 
of about one million acres of cotton in Egypt, or alternatively, at least half a 
million acres in Sudan.’47 To lock the ‘millions of pounds per annum’ 
prospect on a firm basis, and hence transform the contents of Emperor 
Menelik’s ‘pledge’ under the notes, the British engaged with successive 
Ethiopian sovereigns to obtain a treaty for the control and use of the Nile 
River and Lake Tana.  
                                           
44 D. E. Dupuis (1936), ‘Lake Tana and the Nile’, 35.138 Journal of the Royal 
African Society, pp. 18-25. 
45 William Garstin (1905), ‘Report upon the Basin of the Upper Nile with proposals 
for the improvement of that river’, 25.1 The Geographical Journal, p.76. 
46 British Foreign Office, supra note 27. 
47 Lord Allenby, Lake Tana Negotiations, January 1923, FO 371/8403, Cairo.  
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On the basis of texts extracted from British diplomatic correspondences 
effected in the course of 1904-1914, Lord Allenby and Lord Kitchener wrote 
that different payment arrangements were suggested to both Emperor 
Menelik and Ras Teferi / Emperor Haileselassie. The maximum monetary 
offer was 175,000 Sterling in lump sum and an annual retention fee of 
20,000 Sterling payable as water rentals for at least a 30 years concession. 
Under the proposed agreement, the Abyssinian government would grant 
permission to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the Majesty’s government to 
erect any works and buildings necessary and proper at the outlet of Lake 
Tana for the purpose of controlling the discharge of the Lake’s water and for 
maintaining the facility so that Lake Tana and Blue Nile shall be used to the 
best advantage of the irrigational needs of Sudan and Egypt.48 The 
engineering works would enable the Lake to hold no less than 8 Billion 
Cubic Meters of water - although subsequent investigations proved that the 
amount of water available for storage would merely be about 3 Billion Cubic 
Metres, an equivalent of the water stored at the time  at the Aswan Low 
Dam. If one has a grasp of the profound role the Aswan Low Dam had 
played in the pre-1960 Egypt, it would not be difficult to envisage what 
position the Tana Dam project would have situated Ethiopia vis-à-vis its 
relations with Sudan and Egypt.   
Yet, despite the rigorous negotiations conducted in the course of 1902-
1913, no dam concession was dispensed during the reign of Emperor 
Menelik. In 1915, Colonel Dwight Wylie, London’s legate in Addis Ababa 
approached Lij Eyasu, the short-lived designate-emperor of Ethiopia (1913-
1916) with a proposal containing financial compensation and annual annuity 
in consideration for Ethiopia’s commitment to sanction the construction of 
the storage facility and some limitations on latter’s sovereign rights of 
utilizing the Blue Nile.49 He did not succeed. Constitutional wavering in 
Ethiopian politics, the world war and a fine-tuned British interest over the 
subject prompted the stakeholders to put the matter on hold until an 
opportune moment ruptured for negotiation.  
In 1922, in the face of mounting pressure from the cotton industry, 
London instructed Major Dodds, its representation in Addis Ababa ‘to sound 
to the Abyssinian authorities as to the possibility of concluding a treaty’;50 a 
succession of draft agreements enclosing concrete offers were presented to 
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49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid.  
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Ras Teferi. Despite the ceaseless diplomatic pressures and threats by the 
British, a blend of local political considerations, the concession’s implication 
on Ethiopia’s sovereignty, and eventually, the country’s resolve to undertake 
the venture as ‘an Ethiopian enterprise’ worked in concert to rebuff 
London’s enduring claim for physical control of the Nile in Ethiopia. While 
letting the Tana Dam scheme linger on the negotiating table, the Ras 
constantly put British aspirations for a footing in the Ethiopian Nile on hold 
that at one point Bentinck had to complain the British were in fact dealing 
‘with an impossible and dilatory people who would appear all to expect to 
live as long as Methuselah!.’51 The New York Tribune wrote that it seemed 
as though ‘the diplomatists of the little mountain kingdom had made British 
policy look like a trifle foolish.’52 
The protracted negotiations continued, but took a particular downturn 
when, in September 1927, Ras Teferi pledged to honour his people’s long-
standing call for development and hence proposed to set up the Tana venture 
by employing ‘Ethiopian resources.’ He wrote to London’s envoy in Addis 
Ababa that Ethiopia will ‘in accordance with the suggestion made to us by 
our engineer who examined the lake build a dam on Lake Tsana, if possible 
with Government money’, and if not, by forming a company; ‘after 
reserving as much of the waters as we may require for our needs… (we 
would only) let out on hire the rest of the waters to the Sudan 
Government.’53 In the immediate aftermath, accounts of Ethiopian 
negotiation and the conclusion of a contract with an American firm, the J. G. 
White Engineering Corporation were reported in major news channels54 and 
official correspondences.55    
In unpredicted turn of events, however, high-level talks continued with 
the British Sudan and the J. G. White Engineering Corporation. In 1930, Ras 
Teferi convened discussion with MacGregor, the Irrigation Advisor of the 
Sudanese Government and Lardner, vice president of J. G. White 
Engineering Corp, in Addis Ababa. The parties, still ambivalent on details 
that really mattered, agreed to lay the groundwork for an ‘an early settlement 
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Ababa. 
52 New York Tribune, ‘American Capital at Lake Tana’, 23 March 1930. 
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of the question’ of dam concession. The eventual decision of the Ethiopian 
government shall hinge on the assessment of the final report of the 
engineering studies on the Lake and the proposed road to be constructed 
from Addis Ababa to the lake, to be compiled by the J. G. White 
Engineering Corporation with Sudanese finance. 56  
By 1931, Ethiopia was poised to take realistic measures with a view to 
executing the project. It abandoned its original design that proposed to 
surrender a concession in favour of an American company with a power to 
construct a reservoir and possibly rent its waters; instead, it offered to carry 
out the venture as a joint Ethio-Sudanese undertaking, a very rare 
opportunity from a downstream perspective. Unfortunately, the new opening 
coincided with worldwide collapse of the prices of cotton, Sudan’s chief 
export commodity. Economic factors rendered Sudan unable to fully engage 
in the scheme and denied it a chance to exploit the real prospect availed. 
Against ‘the risk that Sudan may permanently lose ground on the Lake Tana 
Question’, its British Governor General Sir Maffey admitted that its 
government’s ‘own circumstances would preclude it from making any 
move’57 by way of committing resources for construction of works.  
Apart from these botched developments, sequences of correspondences 
were also exchanged and new draft agreements laid based on the assumption 
that a third party, the Egyptian Government, shall involve in the negotiations. 
Although a preliminary engineering report of the White Engineering Co. 
was received as early as in April 1935, it was agreed that further technical 
investigation of the scheme should be carried out. By 1935, a draft agreement 
detailing the rights and obligations of the parties was framed - very much 
along the lines of the proposals submitted in the 1920’s. With Italian 
aggression of Ethiopia in the same year, however, the inauspicious enterprise 
that consumed decades of intense diplomacy was once again aborted. Efforts 
to revitalize the process in the 1940’s and 1950’s proved ineffective. For 
various reasons, the Anglo-Sudanese desperation for securing the concession 
had either been ill-timed or greeted with unsympathetic diplomacy on the 
part of Ethiopia.  
Clearly, none of the schemes proposed by the British had laboured on an 
arrangement that would have satisfied Ethiopia’s legitimate requirements in 
the short term - without a disproportionate detriment. The grant of the Tana 
Dam concession, or in defiance, Ethiopia’s own construction of the project 
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could have procured some spill-off effects, not to mention the possible threat 
to its independence.  
However, it is evident that on a balance, Ethiopia’s vacillation on the 
subject has negatively affected its hydro-political position in the basin. The 
Emperor himself had always argued that the study reports carried out in 
1923 by Graham and Black and the 1931 technical reports submitted by 
White Engineering Co. would suffice to launch works; yet, repeatedly, the 
Emperor procrastinated in taking practical measures on the ground. Over the 
long term, the grant of the concession or Ethiopia’s own construction of the 
dam could have brought a much-needed currency, facilitated the transfer of 
vital construction technology, but above all, it would have provided Ethiopia 
an important leverage - economic and political - over Egypt and Sudan, 
centre-staging the country in the management of the Nile affairs. In the 
development of hydraulic infrastructures and the authority of legal poses, the 
subsequent decades saw a stronger hegemony of the Sudanese and Egyptian 
states and Ethiopia’s diminishing stature on the subject.  
Failure of the dam negotiations also denied Ethiopia of the possibility of 
establishing small-scale ‘user rights’ on other sections of the Nile basin 
through the employ of analogous technology, quicker survey of water 
resource potentials and development of water control facilities. While it is 
clear that the dam alone could not proffer answer to all of Ethiopia’s hydro-
political predicaments of the time, the realization of new advances in water 
control works would have stalled, or at least countered the unabated 
downstream hegemony that reigned in the subsequent decades with regard to 
the rights of utilization of the Nile waters.  
5. The post-dam developments: waning clout of 
Ethiopia’s hydro-legal posture 
The unyielding negotiations on the Lake Tana Dam and Ethiopia’s failure to 
adopt decisive measures, coupled with new geo-political developments in 
the region, forced the British, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Egypt to fine-
tune their policies. In contrast to Great Britain’s time honoured approach of 
instituting water control works in ‘upstream Nile’ with a view to providing 
water requirements of the ‘downstream states’, increasingly, Sudan and 
Egypt foresaw the ultimate security of their water supplies as resting on the 
erection of reservoirs ‘within their jurisdictions’. Sudan’s strategic resolve to 
initiate the construction and expansion of the Sennar and the Rosaries dams 
in 1926 and 1956 respectively, while engaging in the Lake Tana Dam 
negotiations with Ethiopia, gradually reduced its projected dependence on an 
Ethiopian dam and trumped down Ethiopia’s bargaining vigour.  
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The fate of perhaps the ‘last’ diplomatic exercise on the subject - the 
British Memorandum on International Aspects of Waters of the Blue Nile 
(1954) prepared for presentation to Emperor Haileselassie was not any 
different. The only difference noted in the latest scheme was that it 
contained a specific provision on ‘the possibility of working out an 
arrangement that would satisfy the legitimate requirements of Ethiopia [in 
the provision of hydropower], Egypt and the Sudan.’58 In any event, by 
1956, the Sudanese government declared it would give ‘first priority’ to the 
Rosaries Dam, effectively substituting the needs for works on the Ethiopian 
Blue Nile, at least for many years to come.59   
Similarly, Egypt’s acquisition of alternative supply from the Gebel Aulia 
Dam on the White Nile in Sudan (1932), the successive heightening of the 
Aswan Low Dam and most importantly, the prophetic choice of its 
nationalist administration to embark on the construction of the Aswan High 
Dam - hoarding the entire Nile floods within its territories - effectively 
heralded the concluding stage of the age-old pleas for dispensation of a 
concession on the Lake Tana Dam in Ethiopia. In 1951, Egypt formally 
shelved negotiations on the project. At a snail's pace, Ethiopia came to grasp 
that the Nile hydro-politics had been orchestrated to uphold the fundamental 
interests of the downstream states; its perceptions of ‘little national stake’ in 
the negotiations lingered, prompting the gradual ‘filing-away’ of favour for 
the dam initiative. 
More importantly, with the collapse of the British colonial establishment 
in Africa, it became evident that no one state could any longer exercise 
strong political leverage and stage-manage basin-wide development 
strategies on a scale and in style exercised by the British. In the post-1960 
period, thoughts of grand schemes analogous to the Owen Falls Dam, Lake 
Tana Dam or the Equatorial Nile Projects that contemplated to institute 
‘water control works in upstream territories’ with a view to advancing, with 
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petite reciprocity, the economic goods of Egypt and Sudan, represented 
‘antiquated’ approaches in river resources management - discarded out of 
hand. From water security perspective too, a body of opinion developed that 
with the ‘protective role’ of the British administration now unattainable, 
Egypt and Sudan would have to work on a plan that ‘lessens their 
dependence’ for the supply of the Nile waters on hydraulic works remotely 
situated across the Great Lakes and in Ethiopia.  
Naturally, Ethiopia was disturbed by developments on the Aswan High 
Dam project; when realized, the new scheme would significantly pre-empt 
any future chances of utilization of the Nile waters upstream. In sharp 
contrast to the leverages exercised by Ethiopia in the pre-1954 period, the 
initiation and subsequent negotiations on the Aswan project epitomized a 
pinnacle in Ethiopia’s declining influence over the Nile affairs. Major Dodds 
summarized Ethiopia’s attitude of the time: the country resented the fact that 
the Nile brings her no material recompense, and still more the fact that 
Egypt and Sudan calmly sit down to negotiate a comprehensive agreement 
for the division of the whole water without any reference to Ethiopia.60 In 
fact, the talks between Sudan and Egypt on full utilization of the Nile waters 
were conducted behind closed doors - in complete disregard of Ethiopia’s 
previous engagements and national stakes. Ethiopia - who failed time after 
time to realize developments on the Blue Nile - was reduced to lamenting its 
diplomatic misfortune, with sweeping implications on its hegemonic stature 
as well as the hydro-political discourse in the basin. Five full decades had to 
elapse before it could direct, once again, its hydro-political eminence - 
through the commissioning of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.   
6. The diplomatic and legal confront: the final stages 
(1955-1957)  
Caught off guard by Egypt’s new initiative, Ethiopia moved to defend its 
rights through the employ of new diplomatic and legal manoeuvres. 
However, it failed to impress the downstream-oriented developmental 
trajectory through the placement of concrete hydraulic works on the ground.  
Amid confusions, it first endeavoured to know Great Britain’s view and 
its counsel in relation to the new developments. Left in the darks with regard 
to the negotiations between Sudan and Egypt, and this despite its insistent 
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demands for information, in 1955, Ethiopia requested Great Britain if it was 
‘a fact that Egypt and the Sudan had now agreed to divide the waters 
between them and what attitude we (i.e., Great Britain) take about the rights 
of the countries on the upper river’.  
In its reply, Great Britain asserted that it had already ‘informed the 
Egyptian Government of our interest in respect of Uganda and Tanganyika 
in the event of any Sudanese-Egyptian agreement.’61 Of course, initially, 
Great Britain had reasoned that it would be inopportune to introduce the 
question of the East African states and complicate the negotiations; 
nevertheless, it shared the East African Governments’ anxiety that ‘their 
claim to a share in the Nile waters should not go by default.’ A suggestion 
was made in the initial stages that ‘the division of the Nile waters between 
Egypt and Sudan should be made on a proportionate basis and not in terms 
of absolute quantities, i.e. each country would be given a stated proportion 
of the natural flow at Aswan’ when working on bringing this matter to the 
attention of the Egyptian Government.62 In November 1955, Great Britain 
formally registered its reservation with regard to future rights of use of its 
other colonies - Kenya, Uganda and the Tanganyika territory.63 
From Ethiopian perspective, the urgency of the situation was clearly 
evident that the protection of its stakes depended on legal defences as well 
as the physical surveying, planning and construction of hydraulic works. The 
British Embassy in Addis Ababa shared this position. It held that ‘if Ethiopia 
                                           
61 African Department, 13 June 1955, FO 371/113733, London.  
62 W.H. Luce, Governor General Office in Khartoum to T. E. Bromley, African 
Department, London, 5 May 1955, FO 371/113763. 
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       The US, too, had declared it position on the matter. On and off, the US was 
involved in the early stages of negotiations on the development of the High Dam. 
In 1956, Undersecretary Herbert Hoover asserted that his government’s 
participation ‘in any phase of the (Aswan) project affecting the interests of other 
countries would assume a satisfactory settlement of the problem relating to the 
division of the Nile waters’. Nevertheless, the truth remained that his country was 
deeply engaged in the funding process both on political and ideological 
considerations - without such assurances put in place. In spite of the pledge that 
‘no action in derogation of Ethiopia’s legitimate rights should be taken without 
Ethiopia’s consent’, it was also open how such interest would be preserved under 
the circumstances. 
       Undersecretary Herbert Hoover, US Department of State to Aklilu Habtewold, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, 26 May 1956, FO 371/119062. 
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stands any chance of interesting the Sudanese in their own plans for the Nile 
development before the Sudanese acquired some kind of downstream user 
rights, they would certainly be well advised to get on with the quickest 
possible survey… rather than adopt the Point Four program which will not 
give them even a basis on which to plan until 1962.’64 The Embassy was 
perhaps referring to the 1923 and 1931 study reports by Graham and Black 
and the J. G. White Engineering Corporation.  
The British Embassy officials were not, however, congruent on the 
subject. Mansfield doubted if it was really necessary to have claims staked, 
despite past encouragements, for a share in Nile waters. He argued that in 
light of the US Supreme Court’s attitude to ‘prior appropriation’ and the 
apparently respectable doctrine of the ‘absolute sovereignty rule’ which 
applied in recent cases, Ethiopia would anyway be awarded considerable 
shares by any international arbitration in consequence of the application of 
international principles.65 
On May 30, 1956, Ethiopia asked Great Britain for copy of the text of 
reservation it effected and the replies of Egypt and Sudan. Left in the dark 
by an infant regime of international law and on how to proceed with 
protecting its rights, Ethiopia was convinced that the best course under the 
circumstances would be to register a diplomatic reservation. It was ironic, 
however, that even after doing  some  research and consulting legal advisors 
at the Foreign Office on the subject of the use of international rivers, London 
itself was not in a position to say what exact obligations rest in states using 
waters which might otherwise be used by another upstream state. The 
Foreign Office seemed to hold the view that legally, it appears open to doubt 
whether a claim could be advanced that a state has no right to utilize the 
upper waters of a river to the detriment of a neighbouring state down the 
stream.66 Their opinions were influenced by old commentaries composed 
from the great works of Oppenheim, Fenwick and Clyde Eagleton - 
authorities on the subject of international law.  
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In any event, based on the counsel tendered by Great Britain, Ethiopia 
issued two reservations in 195667 and 1957 - the latter distributed to the 
diplomatic missions in Cairo.68 Ethiopia stated its disappointment that unlike 
the discussions pursued in the period between 1924-1951, it has not been 
consulted. Ethiopia’s communiqué stated that it is the source of nearly the 
entirety of the waters involved, and that Ethiopia once again makes it clear 
that the quantities of the waters available to others must always depend on 
the ever-increasing extent to which Ethiopia, the original owner, requires to 
utilize for the needs of her growing population and economy. To this end, 
the Imperial Ethiopian Government found it important to reassert and 
reserve now and for the future, the right to take all such measures in respect 
of its water resources whatever may be the measure of utilization of such 
waters sought by recipient states situated along the course of that river. In 
tandem, Pierre Petridis had to work on Ethiopian plans for the development 
of the Blue Nile in Ethiopia which proposed six alternatives of developing 
the Tana dam scheme for power and irrigation, to acquaint the plan to the 
world, and strive to involve Sudan in a joint scheme.69 It was a measure 
which was indeed bold, but too late. 
Uncertainties with regard to the regime of international watercourses law 
also meant that two schools of thought had to evolve in Ethiopia about the 
most effective ways to establish its right to a share in the Nile waters. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was convinced that the Blue Nile communiqué 
presented above would be insufficient, and hence a clear statement 
advocating absolute sovereignty has to be called for. Obviously, this position 
did not reflect on Ethiopia’s past engagements with Great Britain, Sudan and 
Egypt. On the other hand, the Ministry of Works advocated the doctrine of 
equitable apportionment - which appeared realistic in light of Ethiopia’s 
beleaguered position in the subsequent negotiations. 
Conclusions 
There is no doubt that the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty and the stream of 
negotiations on the Lake Tana Dam - conducted in the course of 1900-1954 
- have had deleterious impact on the hydro-legal position of Ethiopia. While 
                                           
67 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Communiqué, Ethiopian Herald, 6 February 
1956, Addis Ababa. 
68 Aide Memoire of 23 Sept. 1957, encl. in Dispatch no. 342 from the Counselor of 
American Embassy in Cairo (Ross) to the Department of State, MS. Department 
of State, file 974.7301/10-857, 8 October 1957. 
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Ethiopia had been able to propel its own canoe in the first half of the 20th 
century, a combination of factors worked in concert to deny it of any 
possibility in the utilization of the Nile resources within its jurisdiction. 
Ethiopia’s imperial vacillation was vexatious; besides, in formulating 
development schemes on the Nile, British hegemonic designs leaned too 
heavily towards Sudan and Egypt – molding, over time, deeply engrained 
perceptions of proprietorship along the downstream course.     
Of course, with the assent to power of Ras Teferi in Ethiopian politics, a 
systemic synthesis of hydraulic information was undertaken on the Blue Nile 
and firm plans had been flouted for its harnessing. Yet, Ethiopia failed to 
disengage itself from injurious effects of the 1902 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty 
by taking crucial measures - even when opportune moments opened up. 
While the Nile River and Lake Tana had always constituted a central 
mainstay of the governments’ developmental endeavours, little, if any, was 
done to transform these vital tools of foreign policy into economic gains. 
Hence, as milestone changes took place in Egypt and Sudan in the form of 
the commissioning of the picturesque Aswan High Dam and the expansion 
of irrigational infrastructures on inconceivable tempo, Ethiopia remained a 
bystander. It failed to emulate downstream policies or engage in the pursuit 
of a lone conduct that could have procured material impact on its sovereign 
interests and hydro-political posture: a comprehensive survey, design and 
development of the Blue Nile. In fact, it took five decades of political 
lamentation and deep-seated sense of exclusion before the country could 
embark on a serious water resources development initiative - constructing 
the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The new grandiose scheme 
not only challenged the entrenched histories of downstream unilateralism, it 
also obliged Sudan and Egypt to reassess Ethiopia’s hydro-political stature 
and strain themselves to the negotiations table over rights of utilization of 
the shared resource.                                                                                         ■ 
                                                                                                       
                                                       
 
 
 
 
